Family law by CHEN, Siyuan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University




Singapore Management University, siyuanchen@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Case note/Digest is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHEN, Siyuan. Family law. (2018). Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore cases. 18, 477-488. Research Collection
School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2801
(2017) 18 SAL Ann Rev 477
(Published on e-First 26 April 2018)
16. FAMILY LAW
CHEN Siyuan
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard);
Assistant Professor, School of Law,
Singapore Management University.
16.1 While previous chapters of this work were divided into the four
customary main parts - custody, division of matrimonial assets, divorce
and validity of marriage, and maintenance - the chapter this year only
comprises cases concerning custody and division of matrimonial assets.
Custody
16.2 This part is divided into two subparts. In the first Part,1 we
examine two cases in which our courts had the opportunity to clarify
the law regarding shared care and control. In the second Part,2 we again
examine two cases, but this time concerning the issue of child
abduction, with one engaging the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction3 ("Hague Convention"), and
the other not engaging the treaty. These two cases show how the welfare
principle is treated differently in the treaty context from the non-treaty
context.
Applicable principles for shared cared and control
16.3 BNS v BNT was yet another episode in a long-running dispute.'
The parties were married in Canada in 2002 and divorced in 2012. They
had a daughter aged 10 and a son aged 9. Following the Court of
Appeal's rejection of the wife's previous application to relocate the
children to their home country,6 the issue before the High Court here
was whether care and control should remain with the wife or be shared
between the parties - after the divorce, the children had been shuttling
between the parents' respective households even though the husband
had fairly liberal access.
1 See paras 16.3 16.6 below.
2 See paras 16.7 16.13 below.
3 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (concluded
25 October 1980).
4 [2017] 4 SLR 213.
5 See (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 354 at 362 365, paras 16.31 16.39 and (2015)
16 SAL Ann Rev464 at 469 471, paras 16.17 16.21.
6 BNS v BNT [2015] 3 SLR 973.
16.4 The husband cited English jurisprudence7 for the notion that
both parents are equal in the eyes of the law and therefore have equal
duties and responsibilities - a shared care and control order would send
a strong signal to the wife on the importance of co-operation towards
securing what is in the best interests of the children, and mandate that
each parent would have an equal right to make decisions about the
children. The wife's position was essentially that under Singapore law,
shared care and control was only exceptionally granted,8 and sole care
and control should be awarded in her favour. The court denied the
application for shared care and control for the following reasons:9
(a) The English jurisprudence cited were pursuant to a
different statutory scheme that recognised the concept of shared
residence orders. Care and control concerned a broader basket
of duties relating to the day-to-day decision-making of all
matters related to the child.
(b) The courts here are far more concerned with issues of
workability and potentiality for stress on the children when
dealing with care and control than when dealing with custody,
since a court order cannot, without more, create the behavioural
and mindset changes in specific individual parents necessary for
them to co-parent well together. However, the courts have to
tread a fine line between the perverse incentive of artificial
acrimony and an unworkable order.
(c) The parties had serious disagreements within the joint
custodial sphere to work out between themselves and with the
children, including the daughter's choice of middle school, as
well as the husband's wish for the children to take up permanent
residence in Singapore and for the son to do national service.
These disagreements mirrored the contentions the parties had
for day-to-day matters. Putting in place shared care and control
would probably result in gridlocks and further conflict that
would be prejudicial to the welfare of the children.
16.5 This decision provides a timely reminder that while awarding
joint custody has a signalling effect, the same may not apply to care and
control even though long-term decisions (which is what custody entails)
obviously has trickle-down effects on short-term decisions (which is
what care and control, and to a lesser extent, access, entails). Aligning
custody with care and control is not an inexorable consequence once
7 See D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495, A v A [2004] All ER (D) 54 and ReA [2008]
2 FLR 1593.
8 See (2010) 11 SAL Ann Rev 368 at 375, para 15.20, (2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev 298
at 301, para 15.9 and (2012) 13 SAL Ann Rev 299 at 304, para 16.17.
9 BNS v BNT [2017] 4 SLR 213 at [72] and [75] [79].
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joint custody is awarded. For instance, in this case, the court noted that
the children were at a particular stage in their lives where consistency
and stability were paramount objectives if their welfare were to be
advanced in any meaningful way.
16.6 Further, as the husband already had fairly liberal access,
imposing a shared care and control order would probably only create
more disruptions to the children's lives. These circumstances were
similar to AUA v ATZ, l ° where the Court of Appeal also declined to
order shared care and control. Ultimately, a parent can still fulfil his duty
and take an active interest in the child without insisting on absolute
equality vis--vis the other parent in all matters concerning the child.
Child abduction
16.7 TSH v TSE l l revolved around M, a five-year-old Singaporean
who was born in London. His parents brought him to Singapore in 2013
to be temporarily cared for by his paternal grandparents, but the
relationship between the parents broke down in 2014 while he was still
in Singapore. The husband sued the wife for divorce in Singapore, while
the wife initiated her own proceedings in England.
16.8 The English court found that M remained habitually resident in
England and ordered the father to return M to England. Shortly after,
the Singapore court granted interim judgment in respect of the
husband's application for divorce. When M was not returned to
England, the wife hired a mercenary to abduct M, but this attempt was
foiled by the local authorities. What followed was a long and complex
series of applications and decisions in both jurisdictions, in addition to
two attempts by M's grandparents to be granted guardianship and
immigration offences committed by the husband, but suffice to say for
current purposes that the English court held, pursuant to a welfare
enquiry, that M was to return to England to live with the wife.
12
16.9 The principal issue, therefore, before the Singapore High Court
was whether it was in M's best interests to be returned to England.
Preliminarily, this case did not fall within the Hague Convention
because at the time M was wrongfully retained, Singapore had not
gazetted the UK as a contracting state under s 4(2) of the International
Child Abduction Act. 13 However, there was still the English judgment to
be grappled with, since it had already determined that it was in M's best
10 [2016]4 SLR674.
11 [2017]SGHCF21.
12 MB v GK (No 2) Wardship (Welfare) [2017] EWHC 16 (Fam).
13 Cap 143C, 2011 Rev Ed.
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interests to be returned. In the end, the High Court decided that
M should be returned to the wife's care for the following reasons:14
(a) Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act i" ("GoI')
mandates that the welfare of the child shall be the first and
paramount consideration when the court is deciding, in any
proceedings, any question on the custody or upbringing of an
infant. This applies to applications to relocate a child as well.
Where multiple jurisdictions are involved, the court receives
evidence and submissions afresh, and the doctrine of issue
estoppel does not apply strictly.
(b) In England, any court answering the question with
respect to the upbringing of a child - including whether to
order a return to a foreign country - is statutorily obligated to
regard the child's welfare as its paramount consideration. This is
essentially the same as what s 3 of the GoIA requires. In
answering the question, the court would consider factors such
as the legal system of the other country in question. The court
must form an independent judgment and not blindly follow an
order made by a foreign court. However, it has the power to
order the immediate return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction
without conducting a full investigation of the merits.
(c) Although the wife argued that the determination of
M's habitual residence at the time of his wrongful retention was
dispositive, this was the wrong approach. The question before
the court was not which of two courts was the more appropriate
forum. Cases that have decided that staying proceedings in
favour of the forum with the strongest connection is consistent
with the welfare principle because that forum is generally best
placed to determine a child's best interests16 do not stand for the
proposition that a court, in deciding whether to make mirror
orders in respect of orders made by the natural forum, abdicates
consideration of the welfare principle on the assumption that
orders made by the natural forum would be in the best interests
of the child.
(d) The welfare enquiry was full and proper and did not
involve any breach of natural justice. But as the Singapore court
cannot rely on the factual findings in the welfare enquiry as
proof of what they assert, it had to consider all the
14 TSH v TSE [2017] SGHCF 21 at [38], [43] [47], [50], [54] [57], [78] [108] and
[111] [124].
15 Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed.
16 See TDX v TDY [2015] 4 SLR 982 at [51] and TGT v TGU [2015] SGHCF 10
at [61].
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circumstances of the case, including what had transpired after
the enquiry.
(e) Although M had settled in a stable environment in
Singapore for four years, the wife had the capacity to meet all of
his material, emotional, and developmental needs (he had
Autism Spectrum Disorder). Further, M still has strong feelings
of affection and longing towards the wife and there was also
evidence that she was not an uncaring person.
(f) While the husband and his parents took excellent care
of M, M felt he had a warmer relationship with the wife. The
fact that the husband was overly tactical in his litigation and
that his parents and he had little intention of involving the wife
in M's life did not assist his case. All things considered, it was
better in the long run for M's stable care environment to be
overridden by his reunion with the wife.
16.10 TSH v TSE provides a useful clarification on how to apply the
welfare principle as between a state that has ratified the Hague
Convention and another that has not. Under the Hague Convention, as
between contracting states, upon proof of the wrongful removal of a
child, the court of the state in which the application is filed is only
concerned with the return of the child to his country of habitual
residence, and is generally not concerned with the merits of any dispute
over the custody or care and control of the child. As between non-
contracting states, each state would apply their own law. At the same
time, however, the court reviewing the foreign court's family law system
would no doubt be constrained by considerations of international
comity, and not lightly dismiss the extensive findings made by the
foreign court, even if the welfare principle is to assume paramount
importance.
16.11 TSH v TSE also addressed briefly the concept of habitual
residence, which is relevant if the Hague Convention is engaged. This
concept was substantially clarified by a three-member High Court
bench in TUC v TUD.17 There, the husband sought an order for his two
children to be returned from Singapore to the US, which he claimed was
the children's place of habitual residence. This order was sought on the
ground that the children had been wrongfully retained in Singapore by
the wife in breach of his rights of custody under US law. The grant of the
order would turn on whether the children were in fact habitually
resident, or in the alternative, whether the husband had consented to the
retention of the children in Singapore.
17 [201714 SLR877.
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16.12 The court held that habitual residence was to be determined by
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the joint
intentions of the parents, the child's reasons for and perceptions of being
in the new jurisdiction, and the objective indicia of integration into the
social and family environment in the new jurisdiction.18 Further,
generally, in the case of the relocation of younger children and in the
case of relatively short periods of residence in the new jurisdiction, the
joint or shared intentions of the parents could be a significant factor in
pointing towards whether there was any change in the habitual
residence of the child; the longer the period of residence in the new
jurisdiction, and the greater the evidence of integration into the social
and family environment there, the less relevant would be the parents'
original reasons, purposes, and intentions for the relocation in
determining whether the child's habitual residence had changed.19
16.13 Notably, the analysis surrounding habitual residence (and
concomitantly, whether consent has been given for a child's removal or
retention from the habitual residence) in this case did not involve the
operation of the welfare principle - or at least expressly so. When leave
was sought to appeal against this decision, the court dismissed the
application. 2' The wife argued on appeal that the habitual residence test
gave primacy to parental intention and departed from the "child-centric
hybrid approach" endorsed by courts in other jurisdictions, and
therefore further guidance from the Court of Appeal was necessitated.
However, the application was denied, mainly on the basis that the court
had already given clear and comprehensive guidance. In the final
analysis, one has to bear in mind the main objective of the Hague
Convention, which is to secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed or retained.21 This means that in many, if not most,
cases, the welfare principle would not be factored in the same way as a
domestic guardianship dispute would.
Division of matrimonial assets
16.14 This part is divided into two subparts. In the first Part,22 we
consider the issue of how matrimonial homes may lose their character
as divisible matrimonial assets. In the second Part,23 we consider the
issue of whether the "structured approach" to the division of
matrimonial assets should apply differently in different types of
18 TUC v TUD [2017] 4 SLR 877 at [74].
19 TUC v TUD [2017] 4 SLR 877 at [74].
20 TUC v TUD [2017] 4 SLR 1360.
21 See BDU v BDT [2014] 2 SLR 725 at [28] [33].
22 See paras 16.15 16.19 below.
23 See paras 16.20 16.25 below.
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marriages - in this instance, single-income or non-dual-income
marriages.
Matrimonial homes losing their character
16.15 In TXW v TXX, 24 the parties were married for 22 years (from
1992 to 2014) and had several properties. One such property,
IC Mayfield, was disputed by the husband not to be a matrimonial asset
because even though the parties had resided there for 12 years of their
marriage (from 1992 to 2004), it was acquired before the marriage
(in 1989), was not intended as a matrimonial home, and was not
substantially improved by the efforts of the wife or their joint efforts.
Further, even if it was a matrimonial asset at some point, it did not
retain this character because the parties had moved out to another
property, Casuarina Cove, as their matrimonial home thereafter.
16.16 On the other hand, the wife argued that the parties had only
intended to move out temporarily so that renovations could be carried
out at IC Mayfield, but plans changed along the way. In any case, the
property was acquired during the marriage as the husband continued to
make mortgage repayments during the marriage.
16.17 The High Court held that the objective circumstances of the
case pointed towards IC Mayfield as the parties' matrimonial home for
the greater part of their married lives for the following reasons:25
(a) Section 112(10)(a)(i) of the Women's Charter 26 defines
a matrimonial asset to include "any asset acquired before the
marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage ...
ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of
their children while the parties are residing together for
shelter ... or for household ... purposes".
(b) A party's unilateral subjective intentions do not alone
determine whether something is a matrimonial asset under
s 112(10) of the Women's Charter. Thus, even if the property
was not substantially improved by the wife or their joint efforts
as was the case here, IC Mayfield would still have been
transformed into a matrimonial asset by virtue of
s 112(10)(a)(i).
24 [2017]4 SLR799.
25 TXWv TXX [2017] 4 SLR799 at [11] [18].
26 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed.
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(c) Although BGT v BGU2 7 suggested that a matrimonial
property may lose its character as a matrimonial asset if its use
ceases during the period when the parties are residing together
for a reason that has nothing to do with the end of the marriage,
each case had to be determined on its own facts. Further,
Parliament could not have intended that s 112(10)(a)(i) of the
Women's Charter was to treat only the parties' last place of
residence as a matrimonial asset while a prior property used as
the cradle of the marriage for a substantial period of time was
not such an asset.
(d) This was also not a situation in which a pre-marriage
property should be considered a non-quintessential matrimonial
asset. Further, the property was not fully acquired before the
marriage since payments towards the property were also made
during the marriage. At minimum, it could not be wholly
excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets. But given the
circumstances of the case, it should be considered the
matrimonial home.
16.18 A similar issue arose before the Court of Appeal in TND v
TNC,28 where the court noted that in light of BGT v BGU and TXW v
TXX, "[different] approaches to this issue have been taken".29 The apex
court favoured the latter, stating the following:3"
[Since the purpose of s 112(10)(a)(i)] is to expand the pool of
matrimonial assets to cover those which the parties have treated as
part of their domestic lives together, irrespective of when the same
were acquired, the approach taken ... in TXW v TXX commends itself
to us as being both principled and flexible ...
Although the court also noted that endorsing the TXW v TXX approach
effectively meant "once a matrimonial asset always a matrimonial asset",
this would not lead to arbitrariness or unfairness.
16.19 This is correct, because that maxim "in itself would not mandate
that such an asset has to be divided in exactly the same way as assets
acquired during the marriage ... would be".31 Specifically, a court dealing
with assets that have become matrimonial assets by virtue of s 112(10)
of the Women's Charter "would have the discretion to divide it in such
manner as may be most equitable bearing in mind the nature of the
asset, how it was paid for ... and the length of time during which the
27 [2013] SGHC 50.
28 [2017] SGCA 34.
29 TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 at [31].
30 TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 at [35].
31 TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 at [35].
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parties ordinarily used or enjoyed it during the marriage"32 This is also
consistent with the court's mandate to perform the entire division
exercise in broad strokes, while at the same time making adjustments to
weight and proportion where necessary.33 Ultimately, common sense
prevailed over an unnecessary insistence on technicality.
Structured approach and single-income marriages
16.20 In UBM v UBN,34 the parties were married for 37 years and had
four children. The husband was the breadwinner throughout the
marriage, while the wife was the homemaker. The main question before
the court was whether the "structured approach" should be adopted
when dividing the matrimonial assets in long marriages. Specifically, the
Court of Appeal had clarified in ANJ v ANK s that generally, the division
exercise would comprise the following steps:
(1) Ascribe a ratio that represents each party's direct
financial contributions.
(2) Ascribe a ratio that represents each party's indirect
contributions (this would include financial and non-financial
contributions).
(3) Derive the average percentage contribution based on
the preceding two ratios.
(4) Adjust the overall ratio based on factors in s 122(2) of
the Women's Charter so as to arrive at a just and equitable
outcome.36
16.21 The pool of matrimonial assets in this case was valued at around
$9m. There was no dispute that the husband's direct contributions
relative to the wife was 100:0. As for indirect contributions, since the
husband was also involved in the children's lives, the ratio arrived at was
65:35 in favour of the wife. The average of both sets of ratios at this
juncture translated to 67.5:32.5 in favour of the husband. However, the
wife argued that indirect contributions should not assume equal
weightage as direct contributions, and should instead assume 70%
32 TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 at [35].
33 ANJ vANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 at [17].
34 [2017] 4 SLR921.
35 [2015] 4 SLR 1043.
36 AN] v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 at [22]. These factors include the improvement of
assets, the needs of the children, and any agreement between the parties.
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weightage. The High Court declined to adopt the wife's suggestion,37 but
increased her overall share to 40% for the following reasons:38
(a) Although a sole breadwinner would almost never be
considered to have contributed 0% in terms of indirect
contributions for long marriages and the Court of Appeal has in
certain situations accorded unequal weightage to direct and
indirection contributions,39 there was no reason to make the
wife's indirect contributions a pre-eminent factor.
(b) It is always open to the court to adjust the overall ratio
and this would be more consistent with its mandate to look at
the division exercise in broad strokes rather than with
mathematical restriction. Given that marriage is an equal
partnership of different efforts and that indirect contributions
tend to feature more prominently in long marriages, an
adjustment to the overall ratio ought to be made to reflect the
equal recognition the law accords to homemaking and
breadwinning.
(c) The final ratio in this case was consistent with recent
cases bearing similar facts and also consistent with the
avoidance of the "uplift" methodology used in older cases.
Further, there is no need to distinguish between long single-
income marriages and long dual-income marriages in light of
the philosophy of marriage as an equal partnership.
16.22 The Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK4 also faced the question of
whether the structured approach should be adopted for single-income
marriages. The marriage here lasted 35 years, with the husband being
the breadwinner and the wife being the main child-carer of their three
children. The pool of matrimonial assets was valued at around $6m and
the court below had decided on a 50:50 division. The features of this
marriage thus made it highly analogous to UBM v UBN. And, like the
court in UBM v UBN, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that the
second step of the structured approach should be broken down into
two steps.41
16.23 But unlike the court in UBM v UBN, the Court of Appeal was of
the view that the structured approach was better suited for marriages in
which both spouses were working and had made both direct and
37 See TRS v TRT [2017] SGHCF 3 at [13] [19].
38 UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921 at [23] [47] and [66].
39 See Twiss, Christopher James Hans v Twiss, Yvonne Prendergast [2015] SGCA 52
at [21] andATEvATD [2016] SGCA2 at [21] [23].
40 [2017] 1 SLR 609.
41 TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 at [46].
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indirect financial contributions (otherwise known as dual-income
marriages).42 In contrast, for marriages in which only one spouse was
the breadwinner, such an approach would tend to "unduly favour the
working spouse over the non-working spouse ... financial contributions
are given recognition under both Steps 1 and 2" [emphasis in original]."
Critically, the court observed that it did not think that "such an outcome
is at all consistent with the courts' philosophy of marriage being an
equal partnership"; if the court were to apply the structured approach to
single-income marriages, it would "either have to award the non-
working spouse a very high percentage in Step 2 ... or accord a very
high weightage to Step 2 at Step 3. In some, if not most, cases, the court
would have to do both".
44
16.24 The Court of Appeal, in upholding the decision below to split
the division evenly, also made the following points.4' First, in long
single-income marriages, the precedents generally show that the court
would award an equal division of matrimonial assets.46 While different
considerations may apply in short single-income marriages, the court
said it would only address this in an appropriate case. Different
considerations may also apply when the size of the asset pool is
exceptionally large.47
16.25 Conspicuously omitted in the Court of Appeal's judgment,
however, is how the structured approach should be modified or
departed from in single-income marriages, regardless of whether they
are short or long.48 It seems one has to make educated guesses based on
established outcomes. In long single-income marriages, one can say with
some confidence that the division would be close to 50:50, especially if
the homemaker also had to look after the children and/or neither spouse
was derelict in their duties of either a breadwinner or homemaker. In
long dual-income marriages, as stated by the Court of Appeal, the
structured approach would address the nuances as to who had made
more direct and indirect contributions, which in turn affects the final
ratio.49 What about short single-income marriages? It seems extremely
42 TNL v TNK [2017] I SLR 609 at [41]; see also UJFv UJG [2018] SGHCF 1 at [50].
43 TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 at [43].
44 TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 at [44].
45 TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR609 at [47] [51].
46 See Yow Mee Lan v Chan Kai Buan [2000] 2 SLR(R) 659 at [43] [46], Lock Yeng
Fun v Chua Hock Chye [2007] 3 SLR(R) 520 at [3] [4] and Tan Hwee Lee v Tan
Cheng Guan [2012] 4 SLR 785 at [85]; see also UBD v UBE [2017] SGHCF 14
at [42]; UJF v UJG [2018] SGHCF 1 at [50].
47 See Yeo ChongLin v TayAng Choo Nancy [2011] 2 SLR 1157 at [82].
48 See TRS v TRT [2017] SGHCF 3 at [13] [19] and UFE v UFF [2017] SGHCF 28
at [51] [59].
49 See TYYv TYZ [2017] SGHCF 6.
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unlikely that 50:50 is the default, if one assumes that indirect
contributions is a variable that increases in importance over time -
direct financial contributions on the other hand, seem to be considered
more of a constant even if the spouse in question is greatly skilled in
making money and growing the pool of matrimonial assets.0 In the
final analysis, one might say that while equality of statuses and roles is
the ideal, direct contributions create a head start, even if the lead is not
an insurmountable one. l
50 See UFU (MW) v UFV [2017] SGHCF 23.
51 See UGG v UGH (MW) [2017] SGHCF 25.
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